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タイトル: Licensing of a lower-cost production process to an asymmetric Cournot duopoly
著者: Dimitry, Rtischev
誌名: 學習院大學經濟論集
巻: 45
号: 4
開始ページ: 325
終了ページ: 336
抄録: An outside inventor of a new production process seeks to license it to Cournot duopolists which have unequal ex ante costs. Distinguishing “leading-edge” innovations (new cost below both firms’ costs) from “catch-up” innovations (new cost between the two firms’ costs), we compare the equilibria of two license-selling mechanisms: exclusive license auction and non-exclusive price-setting. In contrast to the often-studied case of an innovation that reduces the cost of any licensee by the same amount, we show that licensing of a new process may attenuate the ex ante cost asymmetry, allow the inefficient firm to leapfrog its competitor, and raise the licensee’s net profits.
発行日: 2009-1
ISSN: 00163953
出現コレクション:學習院大學經濟論集 1-51+(1964-2015)


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